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Why Police Should Protect Complainant 
Autonomy 
Randall K. Johnson† 
  INTRODUCTION   
This Article describes a simple way to limit the high cost of 
police misconduct, which is informed by background principles 
from U.S. civil procedure.1 It does so by calling for the Chicago 
Police Department (CPD) to better protect the complainant au-
tonomy of injured citizens under the scaled-down process that is 
used to resolve certain legal claims against officers.2 Complain-
ant autonomy is an injured citizen’s right to control how its 
claims are drafted and framed, even over the objection of a nom-
inal plaintiff, regardless of whether such a right to do so is 
clearly established or not.3 
 
†  Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Public Service Law Cen-
ter, Mississippi College, School of Law. Special thanks to Dean Patricia Bennett 
and the 2018-19 Mississippi College, School of Law’s Publications Grant Pro-
gram. Additional thanks also are due to Professor Hannah Brenner, Professor 
Deborah Challener, Professor Christophe Henkel, Professor John Infranca, Pro-
fessor Angela Kupenda, Professor Antonia Layard, Professor Mark Modak-Tru-
ran, Professor Rachel Moran, Professor Michael Morley, Professor Evan Sea-
mone, Professor Greg Shill, the editors of the Minnesota Law Review, and the 
scholar-participants in the 2018-19 Local Government Law Works-In-Progress 
Conference at Fordham University. 
 1. See generally J. Maria Glover, A Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims, 70 
VAND. L. REV. 221, 223–24 (2017) (“Procedural law in the United States has 
long sought to achieve three related, and often overlapping goals: (1) efficient 
processes and institutions that achieve ‘substantive justice’ and deter violations 
of law, (2) consistent and accurate outcomes based on the merits of parties’ 
claims, and (3) meaningful legal access for those who have claims.”). 
 2. See generally Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Lit-
igant Autonomy, and the Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1573, 1579 (2007) (“Autonomy . . . refers to the individual’s interest in hav-
ing power to make choices about the protection of her own legally authorized 
. . . rights.”). 
 3. The question of whether a right is clearly established, often, has a pro-
found impact upon whether it is fully enforced. See, e.g., Michael T. Morley, 
Public Law at the Cathedral: Enjoining the Government, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 
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The idea is that complainant autonomy supports the U.S. 
“judicial system’s ‘jealous protection’ of an individual’s absolute 
right to control his . . . claim.”4 Because of its protective function, 
complainant autonomy has long served as a low-cost way of up-
holding “personal dignity principles, including the psychological 
or cathartic values entailed in exercising individual autonomy.”5 
As such, U.S. courts have “traditionally operated from the as-
sumption that [certain] decisions are best made by the true prop-
erty owner [of a claim], rather than by another person.”6 
In light of the fact that complainant autonomy has tradition-
ally been recognized as an important element of the U.S. legal 
system, especially outside of the class action context,7 this Arti-
cle seeks to bring attention to the CPD’s undermining of this 
background rule of civil procedure.8 It does so by taking as its 
primary unit of analysis the police complaint intake process in 
Chicago (i.e. the administrative process by which a police com-
 
2453, 2468 (2014) (“Generally, for a right to be deemed clearly established [for 
qualified immunity purposes], a court must have recognized or upheld the right 
under closely related factual circumstances. Many circuits do not allow district 
court rulings to be considered in determining whether a right was clearly estab-
lished at the time of an official’s challenged conduct. Consequently, public offi-
cials in those jurisdictions typically may not be held liable for violating rights 
that are recognized only in district court opinions. And by declining to appeal 
adverse district court rulings, government litigants can prevent higher courts 
from ruling on an issue, thereby preventing the law from becoming clearly es-
tablished for qualified immunity purposes.”). 
 4. Linda S. Mullenix, Competing Values: Preserving Litigant Autonomy in 
an Age of Collective Redress, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 601, 615.  
 5. Id. at 614. 
 6. Id. at 615. 
 7. Limitations on complainant autonomy may not seem to be very im-
portant, but they have serious implications in theory and in practice. See gener-
ally Mark K. Moller, Separation of Powers and the Class Action, 95 NEB. L. REV. 
366, 372–73 (2016) (“Thinking clearly about claim-control . . . requires carefully 
breaking down the concept of a ‘claim’ into its [three] constituent parts. . . . One 
is the protected interest that the right to relief protects—what might be termed 
the ‘primary right.’ The second is the right to a remedy that corrects an infringe-
ment of that interest, or the ‘remedial right.’ The third is the right to sue to 
obtain the remedy from the defendant—which I will call the ‘right of action’ or 
‘claim.’”). 
 8. See City of Chicago, CHICAGO POLICE BOARD, ALLEGATIONS OF MISCON-
DUCT: A GUIDE TO THE COMPLAINT AND DISCIPLINARY PROCESS (Sept. 15, 2017), 
https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/cpb/PoliceDiscipline/ 
AllegMiscond20170915.pdf. (“Whatever the nature of the [police] complaint, 
[each allegation] is framed . . . in terms of an alleged violation of . . . the [CPD’s] 
Rules of Conduct.”). 
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plaint comes to be drafted, characterized, and submitted for in-
vestigation).9 This intake process deliberately impairs the pre-
filing rights of tort victims by limiting the grounds for raising 
claims against police tortfeasors without adequate justification 
(i.e. since all police misconduct claims must be drafted and char-
acterized through the use of administrative law, as opposed to 
civil law or criminal law).10 
Any such limitation on complainant autonomy has espe-
cially negative impacts upon police tort victims, since there is a 
reduced possibility that tortfeasors will be administratively 
sanctioned under such circumstances. This reduced possibility of 
sanctions arises from the fact that the CPD, and other pro-officer 
groups, almost completely control the existing police complaint 
process. One of the main reasons that the nominal-plaintiff CPD 
should better protect the complainant autonomy of real parties 
in interest-injured citizens, even at the risk of possibly interfer-
ing with a defendant-officer’s pre-filing interests, is that it may 
be the only time that a real party in interest-injured citizen has 
any realistic chance to set the administrative record straight.11  
According to a recent publication by the City of Chicago, 
which is called Allegations of Police Misconduct: A Guide to the 
Complaint and Disciplinary Process, the CPD requires that 
 
 9. See Chicago Police Department, INSIDE THE CPD: THE COMPLAINT 
(2018), https://home.chicagopolice.org/inside-the-cpd/the-complaint/ (“Com-
plaints against [CPD] employees are made by [injured] citizens . . . . Anonymous 
complaints are also accepted, although this sometimes reduces the ability to 
gather all relevant facts upon which to make decisions about any given em-
ployee’s behavior. Not all complaints require a formal supervisory investigation. 
However, a formal investigation is conducted in all cases where an allegation of 
misconduct, if proven true, would constitute a violation of the department’s con-
duct rules.”). 
 10. As a general rule, and in numerous legal contexts, the U.S. legal system 
asserts that procedural rules should not have an unjustifiably-negative impact 
upon substantive rights. Compare Charles E. Clark, History, Systems and Func-
tions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REV. 517, 542 (1925) (“Pleading . . . [, which includes 
various rules that govern the drafting and characterization of legal claims,] . . . 
should perform the office only of aiding in the enforcement of substantive legal 
relations. It should not limit the operation of the general law which defines 
rights and duties, privileges and powers of individuals, but should aid in the 
enforcement of such relations.”) With Daniel C. Hopkinson, The New Federal 
Rules Of Civil Procedure As Compared With The Former Federal Equity Rules 
And The Wisconsin Code, 23 MARQ. L. REV. 159, 160 (1939) (“It was not intended 
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should affect any substantive rights 
… The intention … was to provide a simple, unified system which would be 
governed by a simple, brief body of rules.”) 
 11. See generally Moller, supra note 7, at 373 (describing circumstances in 
which “the right of action is public, meaning enforced by public officials . . . .”).  
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“[w]hatever the nature of the [police] complaint, [each allega-
tion] is framed . . . in terms of an alleged violation of . . . the 
[CPD’s] Rules of Conduct.”12 The implication is that tort victims 
may frame police misconduct allegations against police tortfea-
sors solely under administrative law.13 Among the results is that 
tort victims may be deprived of any way of holding police tortfea-
sors to account, due to an inability to call attention to closely 
related claims under civil and criminal law, especially when con-
sidering it is difficult to assure accountability only using admin-
istrative law because tort victims often are deprived of real-time 
updates once a complaint is submitted for CPD consideration.14 
The CPD offers several excuses for its decision to undermine 
complainant autonomy. These excuses assume that countervail-
ing legal considerations, such as a need to protect the contractual 
and constitutional rights of officers, justify the CPD’s failure to 
properly draft and characterize claims that are raised in exactly 
the way that is described by injured parties.15 It also assumes 
that injured citizens may be forced to give up control over how 
police complaints are drafted and framed, in order to protect the 
pre-filing interests of officers, even if such rights do not exist.16 
One result is that claims are strategically drafted and 
framed by the CPD and pro-police regulators, often over the ob-
jection of injured citizens, so as to avoid imposing any sanctions 
 
 12. City of Chicago, supra note 8. 
 13. For example, when an officer intermeddles with the property of another 
citizen, at least in cases wherein there is no assumption that the interference is 
excused, the violation could be framed in terms of administrative law (i.e. as an 
improper use of the police power), civil law (i.e. as a conversion of property), or 
criminal law (i.e. as a theft). 
 14. See generally Jodi S. Cohen, Dan Hinkel, & Jennifer Smith-Roberts, In 
Oversight of Chicago Police, IPRA Gives Victims False Sense of Justice, CHI. 
TRIB. (Jun. 17, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/ct-chicago 
-police-ipra-mediation-met-20160616-story.html (“A Tribune investigation of 
nearly 700 complaints upheld by IPRA [which has preceded COPA as the pri-
mary regulator of police misconduct claims] found the agency routinely obscured 
its findings [excluded many injured citizens from meaningfully participating in 
subsequent investigations] and misled the public about how its investigations 
played out, often giving victims of police misconduct a false sense that they had 
prevailed.”). 
 15. See Adeshina Emmanuel, Chicago Police Contract Scrutinized in the 
Aftermath of Laquan McDonald’s Death, CHI. REP. (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www 
.chicagoreporter.com/chicago-police-contract-scrutinized-in-the-aftermath-of 
-laquan-mcdonalds-death/ (“The Fraternal Order of Police contract with the city 
shapes how Chicago handles police misconduct allegations, disciplines rank-
and-file officers, as well as when the city pays legal costs for police officers ac-
cused of wrongdoing.”). 
 16. Id. 
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on officers. This strategic drafting and framing may not be done 
in good faith nor in a relatively timely manner. Among the re-
sults is that crucial decisions about whether to investigate 
claims, to bring charges, or to lay sanctions often rely on admin-
istrative records with less-than-true information. 
That is why it is almost unheard of for a nominal plaintiff 
(i.e. the CPD) to challenge how a real party in interest (i.e. the 
injured citizen) drafts and characterizes allegations, especially 
when it is done to protect the pre-filing interests of a named de-
fendant (i.e. officers).17 Thus, as a threshold matter, my Article 
rejects any such excuse for undermining complainant autonomy 
under the CPD’s existing complaint intake process. It, instead, 
follows the lead of other recent U.S. legal scholarship on public 
sector accountability and crime deterrence18 by showing “that 
police decision-making at the administrative level is as fateful 
. . . as the … decisions . . . officers make during encounters.”19 
This Article does so by pointing out that the act of requiring 
police complaints to be exclusively framed in terms of adminis-
trative law, as opposed to under civil or criminal law, under-
mines complainant autonomy and redistributes legal authority 
 
 17. See Benjamin J. Conley, Will the Real Real Party in Interest Please 
Stand Up?: Applying the Capacity to Sue Rule in Diversity Cases, 65 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 675, 688 (2008) (finding that “Often, when a party is the real party 
in interest [i.e. the true holder of a legal right] that party lacks the capacity to 
bring suit. . . . Such a party needs a surrogate (other than his lawyer) to stand 
in for him.”); Mexican Cent. Ry. Co. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429, 431 (1903) (de-
scribing the rights and obligations of a party that stands in as an agent for the 
real party in interest, which is often referred to as a nominal plaintiff); see also 
Conley, supra note 17, at 686 (explaining that “courts generally classify parties 
to a lawsuit depending on the nature of the interest the party has in the outcome 
of the suit [so, a party that is accused of violating the plaintiff’s right may be 
classified as a defendant].”). 
 18. See, e.g., Rachel Moran, In Police We Trust, 62 VILL. L. REV. 953, 993 
(2017) (“[This paper finds that] [i]t is long past time to hold police departments 
accountable for misconduct. That is what this [article] aims to do: provide con-
crete suggestions for dismantling the system of deference that has long plagued 
review of police misconduct complaints, and replacing it with a system that ef-
fectively responds to [police] complaints and holds officers accountable . . . .”). 
 19. Eric J. Miller, The Policing in America Symposium: Policing on Behalf 
of the Community, CITY SQUARE: ONLINE J. FORDHAM URB. L. J. (Aug. 16, 2017), 
http://urbanlawjournal.com/on-behalf-of-the-community-2/. Other recent legal 
scholarship raises additional and different concerns. See, e.g., Kate Levine & 
Stephen Rushin, Interrogation Parity, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1685, 1687 (2018) 
(“The current distributional inequity [in terms of how police tortfeasors and oth-
ers are treated under the law] is problematic for several reasons, not least be-
cause it affords the most sophisticated suspects the most protection while leav-
ing the most vulnerable suspects at the mercy of constitutional protections that 
have been interpreted time and again to offer weak and limited protection.”). 
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among the parties. As such, such an impairment may not be jus-
tified, particularly when the misconduct allegation (for example, 
an allegation that the officer has taken a citizen’s property with-
out an adequate justification) could have been framed as either 
an administrative law violation (i.e. improper execution of a 
search warrant), a civil law violation (i.e. as conversion), or a 
criminal law violation (i.e. as a theft). One example of a case in 
point is Elizondo v. U.S., which highlights the problems with this 
approach.20 
The nominal-plaintiff CPD’s undermining of complainant 
autonomy may arise from an assumption that it has transferred 
a property interest in police complaints to defendant-officers, de-
spite the fact that this public information is likely to be owned 
by real parties in interest-injured citizens in their individual ca-
pacity and as a member of the general public. Such a mistaken 
belief may not be reasonable, as indicated by several recent U.S. 
cases. Examples include: Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Chi-
cago and Carpenter v. U.S., which both have been recently de-
cided.21 
It, therefore, stands to reason that the nominal plaintiff-
CPD should allow each real party in interest-injured citizen to 
raise their claims against defendant-officers under any of the 
available legal options (i.e. administrative, civil, or criminal 
law). This modest change in policy is likely to have a host of tan-
gible benefits. These benefits include dignitary, informational, 
and efficiency gains for most interested parties. Specific exam-
ples include improvements in how the CPD and its officers are 
viewed (dignitary gains), enhanced understandings about how 
 
 20. See United States Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Illinois, Fed-
eral Grand Jury Indicts Two Chicago Police Officers for Fraudulently Obtaining 
Search Warrants and Stealing Evidence, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. NEWS (May 10, 
2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/federal-grand-jury-indicts-two 
-chicago-police-officers-fraudulently-obtaining-search (providing relevant infor-
mation about the case, including the federal indictment for each officer). 
 21. See generally 2016 IL App (1st) 143884, 11. (“[This case holds that, as a 
matter of law,] [a] citizen complaint, an officer’s date of appointment, the com-
plaint category, the [police complaint] number, the incident date, the date the 
complaint was closed, and a finding of unfounded do not constitute a discipli-
nary report, letter of reprimand, or other record of disciplinary action that [may 
be exempt from disclosure under FOIA. The court also found that these data are 
not exempt from disclosure under the Personnel Record Review Act nor the Pub-
lic Labor Relations Act].”); 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (holding that “the fact 
that [cell phone location data] is gathered by a third party [which asserts that 
it has acquired title to this information through common law contract] does not 
make it any less deserving of [constitutional] protection.”). 
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the law is applied (informational gains), and more useful inter-
actions among the parties to a police complaint (efficiency gains). 
This Article also notes that allowing each real party in in-
terest-injured citizen to initially control how their complaints 
about defendant-officers are framed does not mean that the nom-
inal plaintiff-CPD must do any additional work. Better protect-
ing complainant autonomy, in fact, could reduce the CPD’s data-
collection and investigatory workload. As a result, the nominal 
plaintiff-CPD could make better use of its scarce public sector 
resources, especially if the CPD shares these complaints with 
other police regulators with the authority to resolve them. Ex-
amples of these regulators could include the City of Chicago’s 
Inspector General (i.e. for administrative law claims that are not 
covered by the CPD’s rules and regulations), the City of Chi-
cago’s Department of Law (i.e. for most civil law claims), and the 
Cook County State’s Attorney (i.e. for criminal law claims). 
A final benefit of letting a real party in interest-injured citi-
zen decide which framing to use is that the nominal plaintiff-
CPD may be put on notice about the high cost of any bad police 
work by a defendant-officer. The Article supplements this point 
by marshalling economic arguments for reform, as opposed to 
more familiar moral and ethical justifications, in its three addi-
tional parts (Parts I–III). Part I describes the applicable law for 
police complaint intake. Part II contains this Article’s positive 
analysis, which includes a detailed explanation of why reform is 
needed. Part III has the Article’s normative analysis. The Con-
clusion summarizes this Article’s findings and conclusions. 
I.  APPLICABLE LAW   
In Chicago, tort victims have a legal right to raise adminis-
trative claims against police tortfeasors under the CPD’s exist-
ing police complaint intake process.22 This right is acknowledged 
by many statutory, decisional and administrative law sources.23 
A recent publication, Allegations of Misconduct: A Guide To The 
Complaint And Disciplinary Process, even expressly-states that: 
[The Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA)], an independent 
 
 22. See, e.g., Chicago Police Board, POLICE DISCIPLINE (2018), https://www 
.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/cpb/provdrs/police_discipline.html (“The Civil-
ian Office of Police Accountability (COPA), the Police Department, and the Po-
lice Board have different roles. The responsibility to receive complaints of al-
leged misconduct by Chicago police officers rests with COPA. Depending on the 
nature of the allegations, either COPA or the Police Department’s Bureau of 
Internal Affairs [(the “BIA”)] will investigate.”). 
 23. See, e.g., CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 9. 
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City [of Chicago administrative] agency, is responsible for receiving all 
complaints of misconduct made against members of the Police Depart-
ment. . . . Whatever the nature of the [police] complaint, it is framed 
. . . in terms of an alleged violation of one or more of the Police Depart-
ment’s Rules of Conduct. . . . Detailed information on the investigative 
process . . . is available [online] at www.ChicagoCOPA.org.24 
Within this context, it is well-established that: 
The intake process begins once COPA receives complaints from resi-
dents or incident notifications from the Chicago Police Department 
(CPD), and then cases are sorted and classified based on which inves-
tigative body will investigate the incident [as determined by how each 
specific allegation of police misconduct has been framed in a police com-
plaint]. . . . COPA investigates allegations of biased-based verbal 
abuse, coercion, death or serious bodily injury in custody, domestic vi-
olence, excessive force, improper search and seizure, firearm discharge, 
taser discharge that results in death or serious bodily injury, pattern 
or practices of misconduct, [and] unlawful denial of access to counsel. 
CPD’s Bureau of Internal Affairs investigates all other complaints of 
police misconduct including but not limited to criminal misconduct, op-
erational violations, theft of money or property, planting of drugs, sub-
stance abuse, residency violations and medical roll abuses [that officers 
may have committed].25 
Any valid police complaint requires a good-faith and rela-
tively-timely filing by an injured citizen or the CPD.26 Once these 
initial requirements are met, and an investigation is under-
taken,27 a recommendation may be made about whether to pur-
sue sanctions.28 Every recommendation for sanctions requires 
on-the-record findings.29 Possible sanctions include a suspension 
or discharge.30 
Each potential sanction must be submitted to, and later 
signed-off on by, the Chicago Police Superintendent.31 Levied 
sanctions may be challenged or appealed, in a number of differ-
ent ways, due to the enhanced protections given to officers.32 
 
 24. City of Chicago, supra note 8. 
 25. Civilian Office Of Police Accountability, INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS: STEP 
1, INTAKE AND CLASSIFICATION PROCESS (2018), https://www.chicagocopa.org/ 
investigations/investigative-process/. 
 26. See City of Chicago, supra note 8. 
 27. Id. at 1. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 1–2. 
 30. Id. at 2. 
 31. Id. at 1. 
 32. E.g. Moran, supra note 18, at 978 (“Chicago’s collective bargaining 
agreement provides that, when the investigating agency possesses video or au-
dio evidence of a misconduct incident, an officer cannot be charged with making 
a false statement unless the officer is first given an opportunity to review the 
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Other appellate options also are available, which may be used to 
overturn sanctions because most complainants are intention-
ally-excluded from participating in the post-filing components of 
the process (i.e. investigations and sanctions).33 
As a result, it should be no surprise that police complaint 
data may be subject to manipulation at the time of intake, during 
investigations and after a final determination.34 For example, re-
cent scholarship indicates most complaints are discounted or un-
der-investigated.35 But, even in the rare event that a police com-
plaint is taken seriously and fully-investigated by regulators, 
less than three (3) percent of the allegations raised by citizens 
have been upheld in recent years.36 
This lack of accountability has real-world implications, as it 
has been found that “most of the police misconduct lawsuits that 
led to settlements or verdicts . . . were based . . . on … complaints 
that were never investigated … [by regulators].”37 One possible 
explanation for this failure-to-investigate is that the CPD, albeit 
indirectly, shapes the entire police complaint process. The CPD 
 
evidence, and subsequently given an opportunity to clarify or amend his state-
ment if desired”). 
 33. See Jennifer Smith Richards and Jodi S. Cohen, Secretive Appeals Pro-
cess Quietly Reducing Punishment For Cops After Findings Of Misconduct, CHI-
CAGO TRIBUNE (Dec. 13, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/ 
ct-chicago-police-grievance-cases-met-20171213-story.html (“In the first exami-
nation of its kind, the Chicago Tribune and ProPublica Illinois found that 85 
percent of disciplinary cases handled thorough the Chicago Police Department’s 
grievance process since 2010 led to officers receiving shorter suspensions or, in 
… cases, having … punishments overturned entirely … [without giving notice 
to tort victims].”). 
 34. See Rachel Moran, Contesting Police Credibility, 93 WASH. L. REV. 
1339, 1366 (2018) (noting that police complaint processes “[are] often biased—
implicitly or, not uncommonly, overtly—in favor of the officers, and conducted 
with the intent to justify the officers’ behavior.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Shane Shifflett et al., Police Abuse Complaints By Black Chi-
cagoans Dismissed Nearly 99 Percent Of The Time, THE HUFFINGTON POST 
(Dec. 7, 2015), http://data.huffingtonpost.com/2015/12/chicago-officer 
-misconduct-allegations (“Overall, [COPA’s immediate predecessor, the Inde-
pendent Police Review Authority (IPRA)] sustained just 2.6 percent of all 29,000 
complaints. Nationally, between 6 and 20 percent of citizen-initiated complaints 
are sustained . . . .”). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Brentin Mock, Chicago Cops, Unaccountable by Design, CITYLAB 
(Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/01/chicago-police 
-accountability/513791/ (explaining that regulators “can flat-out reject any com-
plaint involving a police officer accused of handcuffing someone too tightly, or 
who aggressively tackles someone during an arrest.”). 
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does so by exploiting conflicts of interest,38 the behavioral eco-
nomic biases of police regulators39 and its own path depend-
ency.40 Thus, as evidenced by a host of recent studies, tort vic-
tims have almost no chance of holding any police tortfeasors to 
 
 38. See Chip Mitchell, Who Polices The Police? In Chicago, It’s Increasingly 
Ex-Cops, WBEZ NEWS (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.wbez.org/shows/wbez-news/ 
who-polices-the-police-in-chicago-its-increasingly-ex-cops/fbeca316-8b2a-4ef2 
-beb1-d07f8b6e3bef (“[A] WBEZ investigation raises questions about just how 
independent the agency is. City records obtained through a Freedom of Infor-
mation Act request show that IPRA’s management now includes six former 
cops—officials who have spent most of their career in sworn law enforcement. 
Those include the agency’s top three leaders. . . . ‘[One result is that police com-
plaints] may be seen not through the eyes of the citizen but through the eyes of 
a police officer,’ said Paula Tillman, a former IPRA investigative supervisor who 
was a Chicago cop herself in the 1970s and 1980s. ‘The investigations can be 
engineered so that they have a tilt toward law enforcement and not what the 
citizen is trying to say.’”). But see Miles Bryan, Expert: Police Board Decision in 
Dakota Bright Shooting Is ‘Due Process Run Amok,’ WBEZ NEWS (Oct. 15, 
2018), https://www.wbez.org/shows/wbez-news/chicago-police-board-often-sides 
-with-officers/bacd6ad0-0088-49ba-825b-fc20aded2807 (“The Chicago Police 
Board regularly overturns the findings of [a final misconduct] investigation and 
. . . filing for dismissal by the police superintendent. Records indicate that be-
tween 2005 and 2015, the board voted about 58 percent of the time to allow an 
officer to keep his or her job even though the police superintendent was seeking 
to fire them. The board either found the officer not guilty or reduced the pun-
ishment.”). Such problems, however, are not the sole province of the CPD. See, 
e.g., Christina Hall, Toledo Police Promotion Ceremony Has Family Feeling, TO-
LEDO BLADE (Jan. 23, 2004), http://www.toledoblade.com/local/2004/01/23/ 
Toledo-police-promotion-ceremony-has-family-feeling.html (describing how To-
ledo Police Department Captain Wes Bombrys, Captain Edward Bombrys, Sr., 
Sergeant Mike Bombrys and Sergeant Matthew Bombrys are close relatives of 
former Internal Affairs Investigator and current Special Investigations Bureau 
Captain Edward Bombrys, Jr., who was previously-tasked with investigating 
such colleagues). 
 39. See Matthew Bishop, Behavioral Economics, ECONOMICS: AN A TO Z 
GUIDE (2018), https://www.economist.com/economics-a-to-z. (explaining that 
behavioral economics is a “branch of economics that concentrates up explaining 
the decisions people make in practice, especially when these conflict with what 
conventional economic theory predicts they will do.”). See, e.g., RoNeisha Mul-
len, Perrysburg Township Settles with Fired Chief, TOLEDO BLADE (Jul. 25, 
2015), http://www.toledoblade.com/Police-Fire/2015/07/25/Perrysburg 
-Township-settles-with-fired-chief.html (describing why former Toledo Police 
Officer and Perrysburg Township Deputy Police Chief Michael Gilmore was dis-
missed from his leadership position with a suburban law enforcement agency, 
but still received a monetary settlement). 
 40. See Bishop, supra note 39 (“Path dependency refers to the way in which 
apparently insignificant events and choices can have huge consequences for the 
development of a market or an economy.”). See, e.g., Nick Dutton, Toledo Cops 
Plead No Contest To Drug And Alcohol Charges, CBS 11 WTOL.COM (Dec. 14, 
2009), http://m.wtol.com/toledonewsnow/pm_/contentdetail.htm?contentguid= 
od:yXNW1E0T (describing how Toledo Police Department Officers, including 
Curtis Jewell, do not deny engaging in serious wrongdoing yet are retained). 
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account under the existing CPD complaint process: especially if 
less-than-true information is added to the administrative rec-
ord.41 
The CPD, therefore, does not feel any need to fully-protect 
the rights of tort victims since their complaints about police tort-
feasors are unlikely to be vindicated.42 One such example is how 
the CPD deals with complainant autonomy, which is a back-
ground rule of U.S. civil procedure that is meant to assure that 
tort victims maintain control over their legal claims. The CPD 
does not fully-protect, nor even seem to recognize, this particular 
right. Especially as it pertains to the ability to initially control 
how an injured citizen’s claims are framed under the CPD’s com-
plaint process. 
This point is evidenced by the fact that “[w]hatever the na-
ture of the [police] complaint, it is framed . . . in terms of an al-
leged violation of . . . the . . . [CPD’s] Rules of Conduct.”43 Such a 
required framing has important implications for distributional 
fairness, especially in terms of the type, quality and quantity of 
information that may be introduced into the administrative rec-
ord. By definition, “distributional fairness . . . depends on the 
amount of in-kind goods … [or services, which are provided to] 
citizens … [and is a valid way to measure the validity of public 
policies].”44 
 
 41. See Shifflett, supra note 35. Unfortunately, such cynicism is not limited 
to the employees of U.S. law enforcement agencies. See generally Chris Fusco, 
Absentee-Ballot Handling Got City Election Board Supervisor Fired, CHICAGO 
SUN-TIMES, (June 24, 2016), https://chicago.suntimes.com/politics/absentee 
-ballot-handling-got-city-election-board-supervisor-fired/ (“Jim Allen, a [Chi-
cago Board of Election Commissioners (CBEC)] spokesman, declined to com-
ment about [the firing of Sheri M.] Bowen and also about whether disciplinary 
action might have been taken against other employees [such as Principal Clerk 
and Vote By Mail Supervisor Steven Cieslicki] because of the absentee-ballot 
problems [that caused an untold number of Chicago-area voters to be disenfran-
chised].”). 
 42. See Shifflett, supra note 35. 
 43. City of Chicago, supra note 8, at 1. 
 44. Randall K. Johnson, Uniform Enforcement or Personalized Law? A Pre-
liminary Analysis of Parking Ticket Appeals in Chicago, 93 IND. L.J. SUPP. 34, 
39 n.27 (2018) (using percentage analysis to find out how parking tickets, and 
other related matters, are distributed by zip code in Chicago.). The author’s past 
work with on parking tickets, and parking ticket appeals, has inspired a host of 
follow-up research in Chicago. See WOODSTOCK INSTITUTE, The Debt Spiral: 
How Chicago’s Vehicle Ticketing Practices Unfairly Burden Low-Income and 
Minority Communities (Jun. 21, 2018), http://woodstockinst.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2018/06/The-Debt-Spiral-How-Chicagos-Vehicle-Ticketing-Practices-
Unfairly-Burden-Low-Income-and-Minority-Communities-June-2018.pdf (us-
ing percentage analysis to examine parking tickets, and other related matters, 
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In other words, the CPD has created an alternate approach 
to drafting and characterizing police complaints in Chicago. This 
alternate approach is used to undermine the traditional goals of 
the U.S. legal system. These goals include “(1) efficient processes 
and institutions that achieve ‘substantive justice’ and deter vio-
lations of law, (2) consistent and accurate outcomes based on the 
merits of parties’ claims, and (3) meaningful legal access for 
those who have claims for relief.”45 
For an illustration of how this alternate approach operates 
in practice, this Article looks at U.S. v. Elizondo.46 This federal 
case arose from the fact that two CPD officers were criminally-
charged with injuring citizens, mostly by taking their personal 
property, after being accused of the very same behavior in a host 
of previously-ignored complaints.47 The alleged police miscon-
duct in Elizondo, at least as it was described in complaints that 
predated the litigation, could be framed as either a violation of 
the administrative law (i.e. an improper execution of a search 
warrant), a violation of the civil law (i.e. as conversion) or a vio-
lation of the criminal law (i.e. as theft).48 
As stated previously, limiting complainant autonomy de-
prives a real party in interest-injured citizen of a chance to be 
made whole for violations of their dignitary interests by defend-
ant-officers. This limitation on complainant autonomy also de-
prives defendant-officers, such as the police tortfeasors in Eli-
zondo, of useful information about how their misconduct drives 
up the cost of police work in Chicago. Lastly, it deprives the nom-
inal plaintiff-CPD of the benefits of potential efficiency gains by 
shielding defendant-officers from the valid critiques that are 
 
are distributed in Chicago). This follow-up work has garnered attention from 
local, state, national, and international publications and substantiated my pre-
liminary research findings about parking tickets, parking ticket appeals and 
win rates on appeal. See, e.g., Melissa Sanchez & Sandhya Kambhampati, How 
Chicago Ticket Debt Sends Black Motorists into Bankruptcy, PROPUBLICA ILLI-
NOIS (Feb. 27, 2018), https://feastures.propublica.org/driven-into-debt-/chicago 
-ticket-debt-bankrupcy (describing how excessive ticketing has especially-se-
vere consequences for disadvantaged groups). 
 45. Glover, supra note 1, at 223–24. 
 46. See United States Attorney’s Office, supra note 20. 
 47. See generally Sam Charles et al., Lawsuits, Citizen Complaints Dog 2 
CPD Cops Charged With Stealing Cash, Drugs, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (May 10, 
2018), https://chicago.suntimes.com/crime/2-cpd-cops-charged-with-stealing 
-cash-drugs-sharing-proceeds-with-snitches/ (“‘Two Chicago Police officers 
charged with stealing cash and drugs . . . after submitting false affidavits to 
judges . . . have been the subjects of dozens of misconduct complaints over the 
years. [Nearly none of these complaints were sustained.]”). 
 48. Id. 
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raised by real party in interest-injured parties, which too often 
leads to subsequent litigation with or by the CPD.  
Within this context, better protection of complainant auton-
omy could limit the cost of any bad police work that is not 
properly-deterred by the threat of conventional sanctions.49 As 
this author implied in a 2013 article, which explained why the 
third-party data that is contained within every police complaint 
works so well, this modest reform may do so for three reasons: 
First, it may provide better and more complete information about the 
underlying causes of misconduct. Second, [better protection of com-
plainant autonomy] … may be useful for modeling actual police behav-
ior. Lastly, [this modest reform] … may help … [police] … departments 
… [to] … overcome heuristic biases and other informational failures.50 
Therefore, in order to provide a measure of guidance to U.S. 
administrative agencies that purport to give its officers a prop-
erty interest in public goods or services, this Article outlines sev-
eral ways to better protect complainant autonomy.51 It does so, 
 
 49. It is likely that the CPD has some interest in detecting and deterring 
police tortfeasors, if only to limit its liability. See generally Hazel Glenn Beh, 
Municipal Liability For Failure To Investigate Citizen Complaints Against Po-
lice, XXV FORDHAM URB. L.J. 209, 210 (1998) (“Federal courts have signaled 
that a municipality must systematically address citizen complaints as a part of 
its responsibility to manage and supervise its police officers.”). This liability 
may arise in a variety of ways. See generally Rachel A. Harmon, Legal Remedies 
for Police Misconduct, ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON SCHOLARSHIP AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM (ERIK LUNA ED., 2017) 28 (2017) (“A variety of legal 
remedies for constitutional violations by police officers, including the exclusion-
ary rule, civil suits for damages or reform, and criminal prosecution, exist to 
ensure that officers follow the law and provide redress when they do not.”) Ac-
cording to several recent studies, limitation of liability could be enhanced by 
placing an increased focus on the misconduct allegations that are raised in all 
police complaints. See, e.g., Kyle Rozema & Max Schanzenbach, Good Cop, Bad 
Cop: Using Civilian Allegations To Predict Police Misconduct, AMER. ECON. J. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 1–2) (“This article assesses the potential for civil-
ian allegations to predict police officer misconduct using recently released data 
on over 50,000 civilian allegations of police officer misconduct in Chicago.”). 
 50. Randall K. Johnson, Why Police Learn from Third-Party Data, 3 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 1, 5 (Supp. 2013), http://wakeforestlawreview.com/ 
2013/01/why-police-learn-from-third-party-data/ (applying a ratio-based ap-
proach to determine the nature of the relationship between third-party data 
collection and published §1983 cases.). 
 51. Cf. Alisa Chang, Ticket-Fixing Officers Say They Just Followed Super-
visors’ Example, WNYC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2011), https://www.wnyc.org/story/ 
168571-blog-ticket-fixing-officers-say-they-just-followed-supervisors-example/ 
(“As 11 New York City police officers face ticket-fixing charges in the Bronx, the 
largest police union in the city — the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association — has 
angrily stuck to one position: Ticket-fixing has been condoned for decades as 
part of the “NYPD culture” . . . [In support of this position, some members of the 
union] . . . point out . . . [that] . . . the NYPD’s own Patrol Guide allows for the 
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specifically, by accounting for previously-ignored issues such as 
conflicts of interest, behavioral economic biases and path de-
pendency. The goal is to limit hidden market failures, which 
arise when “a market left to itself does not allocate resources ef-
ficiently,” so that these agencies better account for the high cost 
of bad public service work.52 An example of how agencies could 
overcome these issues, even in cases where a host jurisdiction is 
not very economically-efficient, is described in the rest of this 
Article. 
As such, the Article does not seek to challenge the nominal 
plaintiff-CPD’s right to place jurisdictional limits upon its ad-
ministrative complaint processes. Nor does it assume, in cases 
where complainant autonomy is not fully-protected in adminis-
trative proceedings, that a real party in interest-injured citizen 
has no other viable way to hold a defendant-police officer to ac-
count. This Article, instead, questions the wisdom of a nominal 
plaintiff-CPD’s decision to limit the type, quality and quantity of 
information that may be produced by a real party in interest-
injured citizen while too often allowing defendant-officers to in-
tentionally add less-than-true information to the public record. 
II.  POSITIVE ANALYSIS   
Serious economic issues have plagued Chicago, especially in 
recent years, which made it increasingly difficult for this U.S. 
city to provide the same amount of public goods and services as 
similarly situated municipalities.53 These economic issues arose 
from excessive spending on the CPD, a failure to adequately fund 
the municipality’s public pension obligations, and half-hearted 
attempts to capture valid parking ticket fines and other poten-
tial own-source revenues.54 This inefficient approach to admin-
 
voiding of tickets . . . [But, upon closer inspection, the union’s position is unten-
able because,] . . . according to the rules . . . [in the Patrol Guide, any ‘voiding 
privilege’] . . . is only for tickets that were first issued “in error” . . . other kinds 
of ticket-fixing were never acceptable … [under the letter nor the spirit of the 
law] … such as defacing a ticket by writing false information, or removing a 
ticket from the pile.”). 
 52. See Bishop, supra note 39. 
 53. See, e.g., Chi. Tribune Editorial Bd., How Chicago Debt Exploded, CHI-
CAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 17, 2013, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/ 
plan/ct-edit-chicago-taxpayers-edit-1117-20131117_1_pension-money-chicago 
-debt-police-and-fire-funds-story.html (“Decades of abuse and neglect by its po-
litical class leave Chicago with insufficient funds for necessities, let alone for 
smart extras.”). 
 54. Id. (“The most devastating sin in Chicago was arrogance—mayors and 
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istration led to even worse outcomes during the Great Reces-
sion.55 
The Great Recession, which began in 2007 and led to addi-
tional reductions in the quality and quantity of the city’s public 
goods and services, forced Chicago to become more economically 
efficient.56 For example, the city reduced its annual spending by 
implementing new cost controls.57 It also created a plan to meet 
its public pension obligations.58 Lastly, Chicago improved its rev-
enue collection by increasing local taxes, collecting on its debts 
and ensuring laws are better enforced.59 
One way for Chicago to become even more economically effi-
cient, at least in the absence of additional legislative action, is to 
avoid unnecessary CPD litigation.60 CPD litigation is too often 
unnecessary because it arises from predictable and systematic 
police errors.61 Among the worst examples of these police errors 
involve deliberate under-enforcement of the law, as exemplified 
 
aldermen sure they could see the city’s economic future and, paradoxically, 
doubting that it ever could implode.”). 
 55. Id. (“[The damage caused by the Great Recession] . . . is deep and pro-
longed because [Chicago] City Hall had spent, borrowed and promised so much 
that it couldn’t tolerate any revenue dips.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Fran Spielman, Emanuel’s 2017 Budget Address: “Chicago Is 
Back on Solid Ground”, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (Oct. 11, 2016), http://chicago 
.suntimes.com/news/emanuels-2017-budget-address-chicago-is-back-on-solid 
-ground/ (“Chicago has regained its financial footing because city officials made 
some tough decisions, Mayor Rahm Emanuel said Tuesday in his 2017 budget 
address.”). 
 57. Id. (“Under the category titled ‘improved fiscal management,’ Emanuel 
anticipates generating $86.4 million by ‘sweeping aging revenue accounts, TIF 
reform’ and through investment reforms . . . .”). 
 58. Id. (“The Chicago Sun-Times reported last week that Emanuel plans 
$30 million in ‘targeted’ taxes[,] fines and fees, even as it closes ‘loopholes’ and 
holds the line on property, sales, and gasoline taxes.”). Other efficiency-enhanc-
ing reforms, which include a pension reform option that was originally recom-
mended by this author but only recently-taken up also may be available. 
 59. Id. (“The mayor’s budget assumes $148 million in revenue growth, 
driven by increases in sales, personal property lease tax and city sticker fees.”). 
 60. See, e.g., Heather Kerrigan, Chicago’s Police Misconduct Cases Go to 
Court, GOVERNING (Feb. 2011), http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice 
-safety/Chicagos-Police-Misconduct-Cases-Go-to-Court.html (“Chicago found a 
somewhat counterintuitive way to save money and save face – by taking every 
single police misconduct case to court … [including textbook examples of civil 
rights violations].”). 
 61. See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Be-
havioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STANFORD L. REV. 1471, 1477-8 
(explaining that “someone using . . . a rule of thumb may be behaving rationally 
in the sense of economizing on thinking time, but such a person will nonetheless 
make forecasts that are different from those that emerge from the standard ra-
tional-choice model.”). 
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by how CPD officers refused to address the valid complaints of 
Che “Rhymefest” Smith in 2016.62 
The failure to address this bad police work, combined with 
Illinois’ abolition of the public duty doctrine,63 caused Chicago to 
become the undisputed leader in misconduct costs.64 According 
to its own records, this city paid “$936 million in [CPD] settle-
ments, judgments and legal expenses” from 2010 to 2016.65 This 
translates into $156 million in annual costs, which is signifi-
cantly than what similarly situated U.S. cities paid over the 
same six-year (6) timeframe.66 
Other under-enforcement issues arose directly from the 
CPD’s mistaken beliefs. For example, the CPD inexplicably be-
lieves that it has some property interest in police complaints (i.e. 
administrative records, which contain allegations of officer 
wrongdoing).67 This belief does not seem reasonable, especially 
after a close examination of the law.68 It is well established that 
 
 62. See Nereida Moreno et al., Rhymefest Posts Video of Trying to Report 
Crime, Gets Apology from Police, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Aug. 29, 2016), www.chi-
cagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-rhymefest-robbery-report-met-
20160827-story,amp.html (“Chicago rapper . . . Rhymefest took to Twitter to say 
he was not only robbed . . . but also that he was treated ‘disgustingly’ by officers 
when [Rhymefest] tried to report the crime [and subsequent police miscon-
duct].”). Unfortunately, this under-enforcement by officers may not be uninten-
tional. See Simone Weichselbaum, The Police Laboratory, TIME (2018), http:// 
time.com/chicago-police-3/ (quoting “Sergeant James Ade, who runs Chicago’s 
police sergeant’s union. ‘If we don’t do anything, then we can’t get hammered.’”). 
 63. The public duty doctrine previously immunized government officials 
that failed to fully-protect members of the general public, sometimes even with-
out adequate justification. See Coleman v. E. Joliet Fire Prot. Dist., 46 N.E.3d 
741, 758 (holding that the Illinois Supreme Court has chosen to “abolish the 
public duty rule and its special duty exception.”). 
 64. See, e.g., Steve Daniels, How Chicago’s Financing of Police Misconduct 
Payouts Adds Hundreds of Millions to the Tab, CRAIN’S CHICAGO BUSINESS (Jul. 
6, 2018), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20180706/ISSUE01/ 
180709939/how-chicagos-financing-of-police-misconduct-payouts-adds 
-hundreds-of-millions-to-the-tab (explaining why “there’s little doubt Chicago 
holds the dubious distinction as the nation’s top spender on police misconduct.”). 
 65. Daniels, supra note 64 (“From 2010 through 2016, the city financed 
$486 million of the $936 million in settlements, judgments and legal expenses 
over that time . . . with bonds.”). 
 66. See Daniels, supra note 64 (describing how Chicago paid $936 million 
in total costs, over a six-year period, and the fact that “Los Angeles’ debt to 
finance police-related settlements is a pittance compared to Chicago’s.”). 
 67. See Emmanuel, supra note 15 (explaining that a recent collective bar-
gaining agreement, which was agreed to by the City of Chicago, the CPD and 
police unions purports to give officers a property interest in police complaints). 
 68. See generally Eugene Volokh, Police Officers Have No Constitutional 
‘Right of Privacy’ in Records of Their Official Misconduct, THE VOLOKH CON-
SPIRACY (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh 
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“the people are the … [true] … owners, … shareholders . . . [and] 
. . . custodians of the authority that temporarily vests with . . . 
public officials.”69 Therefore, in the absence of a change to this 
rule, it stands to reason that members of the general public are 
the owners of public goods and services.70 
Recent litigation has begun to challenge the CPD’s mistaken 
beliefs about who owns public goods and services,71 which may 
arise from the fact that U.S. courts defer to police in most legal 




plaining that it “[s]hould be pretty obvious [that police have no constitutional 
right to conceal official misconduct that is documented,] . . . but it had to be 
litigated . . . [in] Chasnoff v. Mokwa (Mo. Cir. Ct. June 11, 2014).”). 
 69. David H. Hoffman & Juliet S. Sorensen, PUBLIC CORRUPTION AND THE 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (2017). 
 70. Officers have tried to change the default rule for police complaints, of-
ten with varying degrees of success, through state and local-level collective bar-
gaining agreements. See, e.g., Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City of 
Puyallup, 259 P.3d 190, 208 (Wash. 2011) (holding that “where some investiga-
tive records have already been disclosed and information connecting the indi-
vidual officer to unsubstantiated allegations has already been made public, fur-
ther disclosure of the investigative records in any form will repeat the 
identification of the officer and violate the officer’s right to privacy.”). 
 71. See Watkins v. McCarthy, 980 N.E.2d 733, 745 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 2012) 
(holding “that the requested [police complaint data, i.e. complaint register files 
(or CRs),] in their entirety, including [any police] complaints found to be without 
merit, are not exempt [from disclosure under the Illinois Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA), although these individual-level data should be redacted to 
remove any information in these public records that fall under a valid FOIA 
exemption]”); see Kalven v. City of Chicago, 7 N.E.3d 741, 749 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 
2014) (holding that the requested public records, i.e. individual-level police com-
plaint data (CRs) and group-level police complaint data (repeater lists of officers 
with a certain number of complaints (RLs), are not exempt from disclosure un-
der the Illinois FOIA and that the CPD has the burden of proving that any in-
formation in these public records should be redacted under a valid FOIA exemp-
tion); See Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Chicago, 59 N.E.3d 96, 108 (Ill. 
App. 1st Dist. 2016) (holding that, as a matter of law, “a citizen complaint, an 
officer’s date of appointment, the complaint category, the [police complaint] 
number, the incident date, the date the complaint was closed, and a finding of 
unfounded do not constitute a disciplinary report, letter of reprimand, or other 
record of disciplinary action that [may be exempt from disclosure under FOIA].”) 
The court also found that these data are not exempt from disclosure under the 
Personnel Record Review Act nor its Public Labor Relations Act. Id. 
 72. See, e.g., United States v. Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(finding that “Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000) holds that state 
and municipal licenses, and similar documents, are not ‘property’ in the hands 
of a public agency” nor in the hands its public employees.). 
 73. See generally Moller, supra note 7, at 375–76 (explaining that “[c]on-
sistent with this property-like conception of remedies, the law of proper parties 
identified, although with exceptions, the party in interest entitled to the remedy 
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it is important to determine who owns police complaints.74 A re-
cent Illinois case that provides useful insights, especially when 
it is properly-contextualized and narrowly-framed, is Fraternal 
Order of Police v. City of Chicago.75 
Fraternal Order, which interpreted 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(C) 
among other Illinois statutes, shined a harsh light on the CPD’s 
mistaken beliefs.76 It did so by strongly-implying, but never 
quite declaring, that police complaints cannot be owned by the 
CPD.77 One potential implication is that the CPD holds this in-
formation in trust for members of the general public, in keeping 
with the public trust doctrine, and cannot transfer title to its of-
ficers.78 Thus, even if such a transfer is the subject matter of an 
otherwise valid contract, it may not be permitted under the ap-
plicable law. 
 
as the only person with standing to enforce the [legal] claim.”). 
 74. See generally Sergio J. Campos, Do Claims About Claims To Claims 
Matter?, JOTWELL (Mar. 23, 2017), http://courtslaw.jotwell.com/do-claims 
-about-claims-to-claims-matter/ (reviewing J. Maria Glover, A Regulatory The-
ory of Legal Claims, 70 VAND. L. REV. 221 (2017)) (“Civil procedure scholars 
continue to debate whether the legal claim is a party’s ‘property,’ as opposed to 
an aspect of procedure.”). 
 75. See Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Chicago, 59 N.E.3d 96, 108 (Ill. 
App. 1st Dist. 2016) (finding that police complaint files “are not personnel files 
in any sense because they pertain to the ‘initiation, investigation, and resolution 
of complaints of misconduct.’”). Other U.S. state-law cases, which deal with dif-
ferent issues presented, also could serve as a launching point for innovative 
work on police complaints. Examples include Denver Policemen’s Protective 
Ass’n v. Lichtenstein, 660 F. 2d 432, 436–37 (10th Cir. 1981) (noting that police 
misconduct data, even when they are contained within the personnel file of an 
officer, are analogous to a citizen’s criminal history data and thus discoverable 
under Colorado state law). 
 76. Compare 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7(1)(C) (2012) (finding that “The dis-
closure of information that bears on the public duties of public employees and 
officials shall not be considered an invasion of personal privacy.”), with Frater-
nal Order of Police v. City of Chicago, 59 N.E.3d 96, 106 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 2016) 
(finding that “there was no legal basis for the circuit court to enjoin defendants 
from releasing the requested records in order to allow plaintiff to pursue a le-
gally-unenforceable remedy.”). 
 77. Id. at 104 (finding that the “Court should deny injunctive relief where 
it will cause serious harm to the [general] public without a corresponding great 
advantage to the movant [police union].”). 
 78. See Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892) (holding 
that “it is the settled law of this country that the ownership of and dominion 
and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters, within the limits of the sev-
eral states, belong to the respective states within which they are found with the 
consequent right of use or dispose of any portion thereof, when that can be done 
without substantial impairment of the interest of the public in the waters, and 
subject always to the paramount right of congress to control their navigation in 
so far as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce with foreign nations 
and among the states.”) 
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A similar point has been made, albeit in an entirely different 
policing context, in Carpenter v. United States.79 Carpenter held 
that “the fact that [public] information is gathered by a third 
party,” which asserts that it has acquired marketable title to this 
property under a valid common law contract, “does not make it 
any less deserving of [constitutional] protection.”80 The implica-
tion is that when the CPD attempts to transfer any ownership 
interest in public information to third-parties (such an individ-
ual officer or an organization that represents groups of officers), 
and it holds title in public trust or as described in Carpenter, 
courts should not allow a complete transfer of property rights.81 
This analysis indicates that Fraternal Order was properly-
decided, although it does not directly answer the question of who 
is the owner of police complaints.82 Specifically, the case held:  
[A]s a matter of law, neither the [Illinois] Review Act nor the pendency 
of the parties’ arbitrations under [the CPD-union contract] interfere 
with [Chicago’s] obligations to [preserve and to] disclose the requested 
[police complaints] . . . under the [Illinois Freedom of Information Act], 
where, as here, no exemptions apply. [Therefore,] [t]he preliminary in-
junctions must be vacated because they prevent [Chicago] from com-
plying with the disclosure requirements … [under state law].83 
Since Fraternal Order also does not directly address related 
claim-control questions, there is still additional work to be 
done.84 In an attempt to avoid future litigation, the CPD could 
take the initiative and put its officers on notice that complainant 
 
 79. See generally Chris Odinet, Data as Property at the Supreme Court (Up-
dated), PROPERTYPROFBLOG (Jun. 22, 2018), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/ 
property/2018/06/data-as-property-at-the-supreme-court.html (“The majority 
[in Carpenter v. United States] is basically saying that even though the agree-
ment between the cell phone provider and the customer says that the infor-
mation collected about user location belongs to the provider, this doesn’t neces-
sarily mean that the customer has no privacy interest.”). 
 80. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018). 
 81. Cf. Odinet, supra note 79. 
 82. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Chicago, 2016 IL App (1st) 
143884, ¶ 31–32 (finding that the “remedy [ the police union] seeks . . . is to have 
the arbitrators order the city to ‘comply with Section 8.4 by destroying records 
more than five years old forthwith.’ However, this remedy would not be enforce-
able if it impeded the defendants form complying with the pending FOIA re-
quests.”). 
 83. Id. at ¶ 54. 
 84. See Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Chicago, 59 N.E.3d 96, 99 (Ill. 
App. 1st Dist. 2016) (explaining that the issues presented are that “defendants 
the City of Chicago (City) and the Chicago Police Department (CPD) argue that 
the circuit court erred in granting preliminary injunctions . . . [to] enjoin de-
fendants from releasing certain information contained in records generated by 
police oversight agencies’ investigations of citizen complaints of alleged police 
misconduct.”). 
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autonomy should be upheld and may even be sacrosanct.85 This 
notice could take the form of an email, a certified letter or a pub-
lic posting that indicates injured citizens have an initial right to 
draft and characterize their own complaints about any officer. 
This Article acknowledges that any such notice may prove 
ineffective since some officers simply cannot accept the truth. 
The truth is that the injured citizen and/or general public are 
sole owners of police complaints.86 Such owners are entitled to 
draft, characterize, and see what happens to their own com-
plaints. 
III.  NORMATIVE ANALYSIS   
To review, police complaints have the potential to reduce 
bad police work and unnecessary litigation. Their potential, how-
ever, has been undermined by a limitation on how claims are 
framed. This limitation requires that every allegation be framed, 
as part of any valid police complaint, exclusively under certain 
legal theories (i.e. administrative law theories). By implication, 
there is no option for them to be framed in other terms under the 
adjudicative process that is used to resolve police complaints in 
Chicago (i.e. civil law theories, or criminal law theories, which 
regulators should be made aware of). 
Such an unjustified limitation on complainant autonomy 
has distributional effects upon the parties to a police complaint, 
since each real party in interest-injured citizen is being involun-
tarily-deprived of the legal right to draft and characterize their 
own claims by the nominal plaintiff-CPD. The goal is to protect 
the pre-filing interests of defendant-officers. Such protections af-
fect the traditional relationship between the parties to a police 
complaint and prevent defendant-officers from being held fully-
accountable by real parties in interest-injured citizens for any 
wrongdoing that is not covered by the nominal plaintiff-CPD’s 
administrative rules. This unjustified impairment, which takes 
the form of a reduction in a real party in interest-injured party’s 
ability to draft and characterize their own misconduct allega-
tions, may be grounded in a mistaken belief about who owns po-
lice complaints. 
 
 85. See generally Keeley & Sons, Inc. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 947 
N.E.2d 876, 884 (Ill. App. 5th Dist. 2011) (finding that Illinois courts “must re-
spect the traditional notion that the plaintiff is the master of his complaint, 
thereby free to choose his own theory of liability so long as the evidence supports 
it.”). 
 86. See Emmanuel, supra note 15. 
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Currently, defendant-officers are believed to have acquired 
a property interest in police complaints because of their signing 
of a collective bargaining agreement with the nominal plaintiff-
CPD. This mistaken belief cannot be considered reasonable, as 
indicated by recent cases at the federal and state-level, even if 
such a transfer of property rights is the subject-matter of an oth-
erwise-valid common law contract. It, therefore, stands to reason 
that the nominal plaintiff-CPD should allow real parties in in-
terest-injured citizens to frame their allegations under all the 
available options: since defendant-officers may not have any pre-
filing interests that need to be protected.  
Thus if the CPD wants to realize the multiple benefits that 
arise from restoring the traditional distribution of rights be-
tween the parties, which could take the form of dignitary, infor-
mational and efficiency gains, one follow-up question is “whether 
different protections must be offered, so as to achieve this 
goal?”87 This department is likely to answer in the affirmative, 
especially if it draws on recent scholarship in local government 
law.88 The best of this work argues that the CPD should offer 
different protections,89 although much of this literature does not 
offer guidance for doing so.90 This lack of guidance, especially 
with respect to what is meant by different, which could mean 
better or additional, leads to confusion about what administra-
tive reforms should be undertaken under the adjudicative pro-
cess that is used to resolve complaints.91 
Therefore, in order to provide a measure of guidance to the 
CPD and other U.S. law enforcement agencies that purport to 
give officers a property interest in public goods and services, this 
 
 87. See, e.g., Aditi Bagchi, Other People’s Contracts, 32 YALE J. ON. REG. 
211, 212 (2015) (describing an “interpretive rule that would better protect third 
party losers in contract: textual ambiguity should be resolved to avoid compro-
mising the legally-recognized interests of third-parties.”). 
 88. See, e.g., Randall K. Johnson, Why We Need a Comprehensive Recording 
Fraud Registry, 2014 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y QUORUM 88 (2014) (explain-
ing that U.S. administrative agencies that provide citizens with greater access 
to public information are better at detecting, and deterring, public employee 
misconduct in various ways.”). 
 89. See generally Moran, supra note 18, at 39 (“I propose three remedies 
that . . . address different aspects of the [problem].”). 
 90. See, e.g., Andrew S. Baer, Dignity Restoration and the Chicago Police 
Torture Reparations Ordinance, 92 CHI. KENT L. REV. 593 (2017) (finding that 
“social movements can facilitate dignity restoration, but these efforts work best 
in tandem with other provisions [that are not fully-described in the article].”). 
 91. Cf. Randall K. Johnson, How the United States Postal Service (USPS) 
Could Encourage More Local Economic Development, 92 CHI. KENT L. REV. 593, 
598 (2017) (describing similar problems with USPS reform efforts). 
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Part III describes ways to better protect complainant auton-
omy.92 It does so, specifically, by accounting for previously-ig-
nored issues such as conflicts of interest, behavioral economic 
biases and path dependency. The goal is to limit externalities, as 
well as any other existing market failures, so that the CPD may 
better account for the cost of bad police work. 
Within this context, there may be several ways to better pro-
tect complainant autonomy under the adjudicative process that 
is used to resolve police complaints: regardless of whether such 
a right is clearly-established or not.93 For example, the CPD 
could explain to its officers that “citizens are the owners of gov-
ernment and . . . public officials owe a fiduciary duty to act in . . . 
[the general public’s] . . . best interest.”94 As such, it would be a 
breach of duty for a mere agent (the nominal plaintiff-CPD or 
defendant-officers) to impair the rights of its principal (the gen-
eral public, whose interested are represented by a real party in 
interest-injured citizen).95 Better protecting complainant auton-
omy, therefore, helps to avoid future rights violations and litiga-
tion due to dignitary gains: especially by real parties in interest-
injured citizens and the general public. 
Another reform option is for the nominal plaintiff-CPD to 
assure that defendant-officers learn from police complaints that 
are made by real parties in interest-injured citizens.96 The nom-
inal plaintiff-CPD may do so by running the numbers on police 
complaints about defendant-officers and finding out what types 
 
 92. See Bishop, supra note 39 (explaining, implicitly, that a low-cost desig-
nation could arise from “reaching economic decisions by comparing the costs of 
doing something with its benefits (cost-benefit analysis).”). 
 93. Other U.S. jurisdictions, such as the State of New Jersey, acknowledge 
the existence of various related rights and protect them against unjustified im-
pairments. See generally Sally Herships, Update: NJ Police Complaint System 
Broken, WNYC NEWS (Feb. 12, 2013), https://www.wnyc.org/story/269147-2-nj-
police-complaint 
-system-broken/ (“The rules for filing complaints against police in New Jersey 
are what they should be, according to Alex Shalom, a lawyer and investigator 
with the ACLU. Citizens can file . . . by phone, anonymously, or even through a 
third-party.”). 
 94. Hoffman, supra note 69, at 49 (2017). 
 95. See Emmanuel, supra note 15 (explaining that a “union recently halted 
a city effort to grant requests for police misconduct records dating back to the 
1960s, arguing that the city violated . . . [a CPD-police] . . . union agreement.”). 
 96. See Rob Arthur, How To Predict Bad Cops In Chicago, FIVETHIR-
TYEIGHT (Dec. 15, 2015), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-to-predict 
-which-chicago-cops-will-commit-misconduct/ (explaining that “a data-driven 
mechanism to reduce police misconduct would be extremely valuable to the Chi-
cago Police Department and the City of Chicago.”). 
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of actions, or inactions, cause police complaints to be filed in the 
first place.97 Such an approach also could help police tortfeasors 
to learn from their errors, which may translate into informa-
tional gains for the nominal plaintiff-CPD and defendant-offic-
ers. 
Lastly, the nominal plaintiff-CPD could move away from 
having defendant-officers deal with complaint intake at all.98 It 
may do so, at little-to-no-cost, by turning over these data-collec-
tion responsibilities to U.S. law schools, other legal service pro-
viders and state agencies such as the Illinois Criminal Justice 
Information Authority.99 Using law schools to do all initial intake 
work may prove to be a particularly-inspired choice, especially if 
the Albany Law School serves as the model for how to draft and 
characterize police complaints.100 Potential benefits include effi-
ciency gains by real parties in interest-injured citizens, the nom-
inal plaintiff-CPD and even some of the defendant-officers.101 
 
 97. See Emmanuel, supra note 15 (“[Former Chicago] Ald. Will Burns (4th) 
. . . said . . . that the [current CPD-police union] contract should be reviewed to 
allow authorities to suspend or fire cops with too many complaints as well as 
officers subject to excessive force lawsuits settled by the city”). 
 98. Compare Mock, supra note 37 (explaining that the “requirement to 
meet personally with a government agent . . . [have that agent draft and char-
acterize the police complaint] . . . and sign an affidavit is not applied across 
other Chicago government agencies.”) with Rachel Moran, Ending the Internal 
Affairs Farce, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 837, 854 (2017) (finding that “allowing officers 
within the same police department to investigate each other presents a variety 
of problems throughout the entire complaint process, from intake to investiga-
tion to decision-making and discipline.”). 
 99. See Johnson, supra note 50, at 5 (“Fortunately, each of these data-col-
lection issues may be overcome by employing solutions that are grounded in 
practice. Several examples may be found in legal clinics, especially when law 
students are used to collect . . . third-party data . . . [about police misconduct].”). 
One potential distribution of authority would allow law school clinics to do police 
complaint intake, other legal service providers to track complaints after their 
submission and for state agencies to analyze how these complaints are resolved. 
 100. See Albany Citizen’s Police Review Board, ALBANY LAW SCHOOL, http:// 
www.albanylaw.edu/centers/government-law-center/citizents-police-review 
-board (“In a unique arrangement, the Government Law Center of Albany Law 
School provides substantial support services to assist the [Albany Citizen’s Po-
lice Review] Board in its duties and responsibilities.”) (last visited Feb. 16, 
2019). 
 101. Studies suggest that police misconduct may arise from poor educational 
attainment, as opposed to merely poor training and oversight, since college-ed-
ucated officers have fewer issues than others. See generally John L. Hudgins, 
Require College Degrees For Police, BALTIMORE SUN (Sep. 30, 2014), 
http://www.baltimoresun 
.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-police-degrees-20140930-story,amp.html (“Nu-
merous studies conducted since the 1970s have suggested that the benefits of 
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But, as this author anticipated in a 2013 article, such reform 
efforts may be limited when: 
[The nominal plaintiff-CPD does not] avoid situations that distort 
third-party data. For example, third-party data may be less accurate 
when regulators and [defendant-] officers share office space. It also 
may have limited usefulness when data collection is not done in a 
timely manner or employs substandard procedures. Lastly, third-party 
data may be less effective when there are costly barriers to [real parties 
in interest-injured citizens raising claims with the nominal plaintiff 
CPD].102 
If these problems could be overcome, at least with respect to 
the police complaint intake process in Chicago, then the nominal 
plaintiff-CPD may restore the traditional distribution of legal 
rights. This distribution accepts that each real party in interest-
injured citizen has the initial right to draft and characterize any 
police misconduct allegations that are made about the defend-
ant-officers. This traditional distribution of rights has been 
acknowledged, and fully-upheld, in numerous contexts within 
the U.S. legal system. These contexts include administrative, 
civil and criminal proceedings, which each acknowledge that in-
jured parties are the masters of their own complaint.103 An ex-
ample of a case in point is Keeley & Sons, Inc. v. Zurich American 
Ins. Co. 104 
  CONCLUSION   
In closing, since the nominal plaintiff-CPD purports to have 
the ability to properly-sort police misconduct allegations under 
the scaled-down process that is used to resolve these types of ad-
ministrative complaints, this Article takes the agency at its word 
and defers to CPD expertise. This Article, thus, does not seek to 
challenge the nominal plaintiff-CPD’s right to place jurisdic-
tional limits upon its own adjudicative processes. Nor does it as-
sume, in cases where complainant autonomy is not fully-pro-
tected in administrative settings, that a real party in interest-
 
higher education in policing include: better behavioral and performance charac-
teristics, fewer on-the-job injuries and assaults; fewer disciplinary actions from 
accidents and use of force allegations, greater acceptance of minorities and a 
decrease in dogmatism, authoritarianism, rigidity and conservatism.”). 
 102. Johnson, supra note 50, at 4. 
 103. See generally 409 Ill. App. 3d 515 (5th Dist. 2011) (finding that Illinois 
courts “must respect the traditional notion that the plaintiff is the master of his 
complaint, thereby free to choose his own theory of liability so long as the evi-
dence supports it.”). 
 104. Id. 
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injured citizen has no other way to hold defendant-officers to ac-
count. The Article, merely, questions the wisdom of the nominal 
plaintiff-CPD’s decision to limit the type, quality and quantity of 
information that may be added to the public record by a real 
party in interest-injured citizen through their police complaints. 
Among the benefits of allowing real parties in interest-in-
jured citizens to describe the full range of harms that have been 
imposed upon them by defendant-officers is that the nominal 
plaintiff-CPD may be put on notice about the high cost of any 
bad police work. As such, this Article argues that complainant 
autonomy should be fully-protected because it has the potential 
to limit any such cost, regardless of whether this right is clearly-
established or not. One reason is the nominal plaintiff-CPD may 
no longer claim to be unaware of misconduct by defendant-offic-
ers, at least once a real party in interest-injured citizen has the 
ability to add previously-ignored information to the administra-
tive record. Adding such information helps to assure that each 
real party in interest-injured citizen, just like all defendant-of-
ficers and the nominal plaintiff-CPD, has a chance to shape the 
record. 
In laying out its argument, which focuses upon the police 
complaint intake process in Chicago, the Article also identifies a 
novel approach to CPD reform. It does this work by letting de-
fendant-officers know what is legally-required of them, removing 
any ability for police to limit the legal claims that are raised by 
real parties in interest-injured citizens and using all relevant 
and probative information to inform the administrative work of 
the nominal plaintiff-CPD. These reforms help to overcome a 
range of issues, such as conflicts of interest, behavioral economic 
biases or path dependency, which arise from the nominal plain-
tiff-CPD’s complaint intake process. 
The Article, lastly, explains why such reforms may be cost-
effective. There are, at least, three reasons why. First, these re-
forms reduce transaction costs.105 These reforms also produce 
fewer opportunity costs, which is the idea that the “true cost of 
something is what you give up to get it.”106 Lastly, each provides 
a potentially low-cost way to better protect complainant auton-
omy. 
 
 105. Bishop, supra note 39. 
 106. Id. 
